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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
Network Protocols such as IPsec and trust management systems like Keynote 
provide mechanisms to secure computer-to-computer communications. These tools 
enable the user to use various encryption and authentication mechanisms to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation of communications. The trust management 
system, Keynote specifies a language for describing actions, which are operations with 
security consequences that are to be controlled by the system. The language also provides 
the syntax for specifying the application policies, which govern the actions that the 
principals1 are authorized to perform.  To translate a desired organizational security 
policy into the Keynote specification language is however a daunting task due to the 
technical complexity of the language. An incorrect specification of the security policy 
might result in compromising the network security and is unacceptable. It is in this 
context that the need for an alternative policy specification mechanism is felt. This 
mechanism should enable the user to correctly specify the policy and also verify that the 
specified policy is free of inconsistencies and contradictions. The purpose of this thesis is 
to analyze, design and implement a policy editor interface that guides a user to specify 
various attributes of the IPsec security policy.  The program will automatically generate 
the equivalent policy in the Keynote specification language. Alternate presentation 
mechanisms will be studied to provide the user with an intuitive presentation and to 
prevent inconsistencies and contradictions in the specified policy.   
 
B. BACKGROUND 
The increased dependence on computers for communication has enhanced the 
importance of network security. The use of the inherently insecure Internet as the 
medium for communicating sensitive material requires that the end users have 
capabilities to ensure that the data transmitted is secure. Furthermore, network 
administrators should have means to translate the desired organizational security policy 
                                                 
1 A Principal is an entity that is either the authorizer of an assertion  or the target of such an assertion.  
A Principal may be an arbitrary string or a cryptographic key that can be used to sign assertions. 
2 
into an automated security policy and have mechanisms to implement this policy over 
their network.  
IPsec extends the IP Protocol to enable security for TCP/IP communications. 
IPsec provides both secrecy and integrity services. A wide variety of choices are 
available when establishing protected communications across the network.  The 
appropriate choice and combination of secrecy and integrity mechanisms will depend 
upon the “trust relationships” between the communicating entities.  Those relationships 
are constrained by the policy of each entity. Negotiation of policy and mechanisms takes 
place in the context of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) framework and the Internet 
Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) (Maughan, Schertler, 
Turner, Schneider, 1998).  However, IKE and ISAKMPD do not provide a general 
mechanism for managing and incorporating security policy. In order to ensure that IPSEC 
consistently meets the local security policy needs of the user, a Trust Management 
System is used to encode policy and support communications security negotiation and 
management. (Thayer, Doraswamy and Glenn1998) 
A trust management system unifies the elements of security policy, credentials, 
access control, and authorization. Applications can use the Keynote trust management 
system to verify, through the compliance checker, whether a requested policy addition or 
change is authorized. (Blaze, Ioannidis, and Keromytis, Feb 2000) 
IPsec implementation in open BSD utilizes a trust management system to manage 
security according to policy.  Quality of Security Service (QoSS) provides a means to 
manage security services based on the requirements set by the user’s requests, the 
system’s security policy, the availability of system resources and the network 
environment. (Irvine and Levin, September 2000)  
Dynamic parameterization of IPsec (Agar, December 2001) provides more 
granularity in IPsec and provides flexibility to adjust security controls according to 
changes in threat conditions, critical time transmissions, and network congestion/traffic. 
This makes IPsec a QoSS mechanism. 
All the above mechanisms depend on having in place a correct security policy 
specified in the Keynote specification language. For any practical real life network 
3 
operations specifying such a dynamic and granular policy is an insurmountable task due 
to the syntactic complexity of the KeyNote language and the inherent complexity of the 
policy logic involved. An XML-based specification of the policy should provide the 
desired flexibility, be easy to use and provide an interface for administration of the 
security policy. This would provide an abstraction to the KeyNote language and enable 
users to derive the power of IPsec and KeyNote in managing network security.  
 
C. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
By providing a policy management toolkit it would be possible to unleash the 
power of IPsec usage and would enable government and military security systems to 
automate security service adjustments according to dynamic environmental parameter 
settings, such as INFOCON and THREATCON. The use of XML in such an effort will 
enable us to use all the available XML tools for ensuring consistency and also utilize the 
flexibility and compatibility that XML provides. The power of XML security can also be 
harnessed to enhance the overall security of the communicating systems. An easy to use 
interface will ensure its use and the correctness will give the desired confidence in the 
overall security implementation of the network. The exploration of XML will also open 
doors to further research in other areas of computer security that will benefit from it. 
 
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research are three fold:  
o Study the Keynote trust management system and IPsec, and explore available 
XML technologies. 
o Design and develop a policy editor interface to capture the security policy 
requirements of a user, check for inconsistencies and transform the stated 
policy into the Keynote specification language. 
o Design and develop a method of incorporating the use of XML to enhance the 
flexibility, maintainability and interoperability of the policy specifications.  
4 
 
E. LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 
The thesis will be organized as follows: 
o Chapter II   Previous Work – This chapter consists of a brief survey of related 
research. 
o Chapter III XML and Keynote policy specification language – a review of 
Keynote language and its specification for the QOSS implementation in 
OpenBSD 2.8. Relevant XML technologies and its application to the problem 
domain will be reviewed.  
o Chapter IV Design and Implementation – the design philosophy of the toolkit, 
the considerations and overall architecture will be discussed in detail. 
Implementation issues of the components will be highlighted in this chapter.  
o Chapter V Research Summary and Future Work – This chapter will 
summarize the research done and will end with a discussion of future work. 
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II. PREVIOUS WORK 
A. IPSEC  
The popularity of the Transfer Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) and 
the growing use of computer networks for governmental and business made these 
protocols vulnerable to scrutiny, attacks and misuse. TCP/IP, which was designed to 
provide packet based communications over unreliable telephone networks, was not 
designed for providing secure communications. The first attempt to provide security 
involved a simple “protect-all” approach to network security i.e. the Virtual Private 
Networks (VPN). IPsec was then developed to address security vulnerabilities inherent in 
the Internet Protocol (IP), by defining a more flexible security mechanism for sending 
data across an insecure medium. IPsec introduced the ability to provide a range of 
security services ultimately defined by a security policy  (See Figure 1). The security 
policy defines specific security services for each packet, according to packet 






















Figure 1.   VPN vs. IPsec Security Mechanisms  
(From: Agar, Chris December 2001) 
 
IPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select 
required security protocols, determine the algorithm(s) to use for the service(s), and put 
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in place any cryptographic keys required to support the requested services. There are two 
extension headers that follow the main IP header and which incorporate the security 
features of IPsec. The extension header for authentication is known as the Authentication 
Header (AH) and that for encryption is known as the Encapsulating Security Payload 
(ESP) header. The difference between the AH and the authentication within ESP is 
essentially the amount of content of the packet and headers that is authenticated. Figure 2 







ESP- Protected IP Packet
 
Figure 2.   ESP- Protected IP Packet. 





AH- Protected IP Packet
 
Figure 3.   AH-Protected IP Packet. 
 (After: Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 51) 
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IPsec was designed to provide an efficient and effective cryptographic security 
mechanism for IP version 4 and IP version 6.  The mechanism provides the following 
services: access control, connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, protection 
against replays,(a form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption), and 
limited traffic flow confidentiality.  These services are applied at the IP layer, providing 
security for IP and/or upper layer protocols. (Kent, S and Atkinson, R, 1998) The 
cryptographic algorithms are applied in accordance with system security policies that are 
defined within IPsec. IPsec can be used on a variety of system architecture models: host-
to-host, gateway-to-gateway and gateway-to-host/host-to-gateway. (Doraswamy, 
Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 57-79). 
1. Security Associations 
A key concept that appears in both the authentication and confidentiality 
mechanisms for IP is the Security Association (SA). An association is a one-way 
relationship between the sender and a receiver that affords security services to the traffic 
carried on it. If a peer relationship is needed for two-way secure exchange, then two 
security associations are required. A Security Association is uniquely defined by three 
parameters: 
o Security Parameters Index (SPI), 
o IP destination address, and  
o Security protocol identifier. 
2. SA Selectors 
IPsec provides the user with considerable flexibility in the way in which IPsec 
services are applied to IP traffic. SAs can be combined in a number of ways to yield the 
desired security configuration. Furthermore, IPsec provides a high degree of granularity 
in discriminating between traffic that is afforded IPsec protection and traffic that is 
allowed to bypass IPsec, in the former case relating IP traffic to specific SAs. 
The means by which IP traffic is related to specific SAs (or no SAs in the case of 
traffic allowed to bypass IPsec) is the nominal Security Policy Database (SPD). Each 
SPD entry is defined by a set of IP and upper-layer protocol field values, called selectors. 
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In effect, these selectors are used to filter outgoing and incoming traffic in order to map it 
into a particular SA.  Selectors are of many types for e.g. destination IP address, transport 
layer protocol, IP Sec protocol (AH or ESP or AH/ESP), source and destination ports etc.  












Transport Mode Tunnel Mode
 
Figure 4.   IPsec Transport and Tunnel Modes. 
(After: Doraswamy, Naganand and Harkins, Dan, 1999, 57-80) 
 
Both AH and ESP support two modes of use: transport and tunnel modes depicted 
in Figure 4 above. Transport mode provides protection primarily for upper layer 
protocols. Its protection extends to the payload of an IP packet. Typically, transport mode 
is used for end-to-end communication between two hosts. (e.g., a client and a server, or 
two workstations). Tunnel mode on the other hand provides protection to the entire IP 
packet. To achieve this, after the AH or ESP fields are added to the IP packet, the entire 
packet plus security fields is treated as the payload of new ‘outer’ IP packet with a new 
outer IP header.  The entire original, or inner, packet travels through a ‘tunnel’ from one 
point of an IP network to another. Tunnel mode is most commonly used when one or 
both ends of an SA is a security gateway, such as a firewall or router that implements 
IPsec.  
4. Combining Security Associations 
An individual SA can specify either the AH or ESP protocol but not both. 
Sometimes a particular traffic flow will call for services provided by both AH and ESP. 
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Further, a particular traffic flow may require IPsec services between hosts and, for that 
same flow, separate services between security gateways, such as firewalls. In all of these 
cases, multiple SAs must be employed for the same traffic flow to achieve the desired 
IPsec services. The term security association bundle refers to a sequence of SAs through 
which traffic must be processed to provide a desired set of IPsec services.  The SAs in a 
bundle may terminate at different end points or at the same endpoints.  Security 
associations can be combined into bundles in two ways: 
















Figure 5.   Transport Adjacency. 
(After: Leiseboer, John, 2001) 
 
Here more than one security protocol is applied to the same IP packet, 
without invoking tunneling (Refer to Figure 5). This approach to combining AH and ESP 
allows for only one level of combination. The advantage of this approach over simply 
using an ESP SA with the ESP authentication option is that the authentication covers 
more fields, including the source and destination IP addresses. The disadvantage is the 
overhead of two SAs versus one SA.  
b. Iterated Tunneling: 
Multiple layers of security protocols are effected through IP tunneling 
(Refer to Figure 6). This approach allows multiple levels of nesting, since each tunnel can 
originate or terminate at a different IPsec site along the path. For e.g. having a transport 
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SA between two hosts could combine the SAs to travel part of the way through a tunnel 


















Figure 6.   Iterated Tunneling. (After: Leiseboer, John, 2001) 
 
Four basic combinations of SAs are possible: 
o Security provided between end systems that implement IPsec. 
o Security is provided only between gateways (routers, firewalls, etc.) 
and no hosts implement IPsec. 
o Security provided both at gateways and hosts. 
o Security between remote host and a local gateway.  
5. Key Management 
The key management portion of IPsec involves the determination and distribution 
of secret keys. A typical requirement is four keys for communication between two 
applications: transmit and receive pairs for both AH and ESP. The two types of key 
management are manual and automated.  
The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol, (ISAKMP) 
provides a framework for automated Internet key management and provides the specific 
protocol support, including formats for negotiation of security attributes.  ISAKMP by 
itself does not dictate a specific key exchange algorithm; rather ISAKMP consists of a set 
11 
of message types that enable the use of a variety of key exchange algorithms. IKE, 
adapted from Oakley, is the specific key exchange algorithm mandated for use with the 
initial version of ISAKMP. ISAKMP defines procedures and packet formats to establish, 
negotiate, modify and delete security associations.  
 
B. KEYNOTE TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
OpenBSD IPsec incorporates the concept of trust and security policy management 
by implementing KeyNote. The research performed in this thesis utilizes the OpenBSD 
IPsec mechanism as a model for discussion and implementation. Figure 7 depicts the 
KeyNote trust management process. 
 Trust management, is a unified approach to specifying and interpreting security 
policies, assertions2, credentials3, and relationships; it allows direct authorization of 
security-critical actions. A trust-management system provides standard, general-purpose 
mechanisms for both local and remote specification of application security policies and 
credentials. Trust-management credentials describe a specific delegation of trust and 
subsume the role of public key certificates; unlike traditional certificates, which bind 
keys to names, credentials can bind keys directly to the authorization to perform specific 
tasks. (From Blaze, Matt, Feigenbaum, Joan, and Keromytis, Angelos D., RFC 2704) 
A trust-management system has five basic components:  
o A language for describing `actions', which are operations with security 
consequences that are to be controlled by the system.  
o A mechanism for identifying `principals', which are entities that can be 
authorized to perform actions.  
o A language for specifying application `policies', which govern the actions that 
principals are authorized to perform.  
                                                 
2  An assertion is a statement binding together an authorizing principal, an authorized principal(s) and 
a set of conditions. 
3 Credentials are similar to assertions, but each credential must be signed by the authorizer.  Thus the 
authorizing principal of a credential must be a public key.  
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o A language for specifying `credentials', which allow principals to delegate 
authorization to other principals.  
o A `compliance checker', which provides a service to applications for 
determining how an action requested by principals should be handled, given a 
policy and a set of credentials.  
The trust-management approach has a number of advantages over other 
mechanisms for specifying and controlling authorization, especially when security policy 
is distributed over a network or is otherwise decentralized.  
Trust management unifies the notions of security policy, credentials, access 
control, and authorization. An application that uses a trust-management system can 
simply ask the compliance checker whether a requested action should be allowed. 
Furthermore, policies and credentials are written in standard languages that are shared by 
all trust-managed applications; the security configuration mechanism for one application 
carries exactly the same syntactic and semantic structure as that of another, even when 
the semantics of the applications themselves are quite different.  
Trust-management policies are easy to distribute across networks, helping to 
avoid the need for application-specific distributed policy configuration mechanisms, 
access control lists, and certificate parsers and interpreters.  
KeyNote is a simple and flexible trust-management system designed to work well 
for a variety of large- and small- scale Internet-based applications. It provides a single, 
unified language for both local policies and credentials. KeyNote policies and credentials, 
called `assertions’; contain predicates that describe the trusted actions permitted by the 
holders of specific public keys. KeyNote assertions are essentially small, highly 
structured programs. A signed assertion, which can be sent over an un-trusted network, is 
also called a `credential assertion'. Credential assertions, which also serve the role of 
certificates, have the same syntax as policy assertions but are also signed by the principal 




o Actions are specified as a collection of name-value pairs. For instance a name  
value pair could be app_dom = ”email”. These are called as action attributes 
and a query is made with the action attributes and their associated values.  
o Principal names can be any convenient string and can directly represent 
cryptographic public keys.  
o The same language is used for both policies and credentials.  
o The policy and credential language is concise, highly expressive, human 
readable, and compatible with a variety of storage and transmission media, 
including electronic mail.  
o The compliance checker returns an application-configured `policy compliance 
value' that describes how a request should be handled by the application. 
Policy compliance values are always derived from policy and credentials, 
facilitating analysis of KeyNote-based systems.  
o Compliance checking is efficient enough for high-performance and real-time 
applications.  
Despite these advantages, the KeyNote Policy language has some technical 









KeyNote is queried using 
assertion syntax to determine 








Figure 7.   KeyNote Process (After Agar, Chris December 2001) 
 
C. QUALITY OF SECURITY SERVICE (QOSS) 
IPsec provides a high degree of granularity in discriminating between traffic that 
is afforded IPsec protection and traffic that is allowed to bypass IPsec. Further use of a 
trust management system such as Keynote enables an application to simply ask the 
compliance checker whether a requested action should be allowed. Thus if we specify a 
granular security policy as permissible by IPsec and use Keynote to verify a request 
based on the policy, we would be able to modulate the security settings of applications 
dynamically in accordance with the security and performance requirements of the 
applications in particular, and networks as a whole. This is the essence of ‘Quality of 
Security Service’ (QoSS). 
In the Quality of Service (QoS) model, resource allocation is adjusted to meet 
user requests under changing network environment and resource availability conditions. 
Similarly, QoSS, see Figure 8, provides a mechanism to manage security services to meet 
requirements set by the user‘s requests, system’s security policy, availability of system 
resources and network environment. (Irvine and Levin, September 2000) 
Similar to the modulation of resources to support QoS, security services can be 
defined in terms of user and system requirements, network environment factors and 
available resources.  Without a range of security services, a user is faced with the rigid 
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and limited choice of “all or nothing” for each security service.  Historically, security 
services have been provided in such a static manner. (Spryropoulou, Agar, Levin and 
Irvine January 2002) Quality of Security Service (QoSS) provides a more flexible 
solution to the provision of security services. The security resource manager and/or the 
security system can adjust security service to meet user requirements, system security 
policy and network environment constraints.  (Irvine and Levin, September 2000) 
Security systems and managers can maintain overall control of the security 
mechanism through QoSS  “system security policies.”  These policies dominate the 
individual “user security requirements.” Specifically, they define all authorized 
operations per user, system, application, etc.   
QoSS has several mechanisms to handle security variablity. A security variance 
for a particular policy exists when that policy may be enforced utilizing a specific range 
of security attributes. Therefore, based on the policy parameters, the attributes used to 
enforce the security policy may differ according to selection criteria such as “network 
mode”. Fixed requirements are used to set minimum level acceptable security standards.  
A range of security settings meeting or exceeding this minimum level can be provided.  
For example a system may utilize SHA as a minimum level authentication algorithm for 
all message handling. Users or applications could apply further granularity in support of 
confidentiality to messages by selecting an encryption algorithm from a provided range.  
Other examples of variable security attributes that may be used are:  assurance level, key 
length or security attribute expiration date stamp.  (Irvine and Levin   September 2000) 
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Quality of Security Service (QoSS) 





Figure 8.   Quality of Security Service (QoSS). (From Agar, Chris December 2001) 
 
1. Managing Quality of Security Service (QoSS) 
Inevitably, security mechanisms result in a cost to the user, system and resources. 
Whether in the form bandwidth, algorithm processing time, overhead, or funds, the cost 
of security is a challenging concern to resource managers.  A “costing framework” may 
be used to map security service resource consumption to available resources; ultimately 
enabling a management system to efficiently and effectively handle security service 
costs. 
Security services, as previously described, may utilize high level services and 
consume lower level resources in a system. High-level services include, for example, 
non-repudiation, auditing, authentication, encryption, or intrusion detection. Low-level 
resources include memory, bandwidth, or processor time. Further, each security service 
will require a governing policy, consisting of specific rules that determine how and when 
to use the service. Therefore each network task associated with QoSS can be mapped to a 
vector of security requirements directly associated with the security services the task 
requires. (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002) 
a. Dynamic Parameters 
Government and DOD organizations utilize a variety of dynamic 
parameters to define a predefined response of specific actions according to policy. 
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Examples include INFOCON and THREATCON levels.  In order for a security 
mechanism to be fully functional within the DOD and Government infrastructure, it has 
to be able to incorporate the dynamic parameters into the security setting decision-
making process.  A change in an INFOCON or THREATCON level should have an 
immediate effect on attributes and settings in a security mechanism. By introducing a 
dynamic mechanism, a system can modulate its security settings in response to these 
dynamic parameters. Security level and network mode, defined in the following sections, 
have been chosen as two abstract dynamic parameters that govern changes to security 
attributes as defined in the organization’s security policy.  (NPS-CS-02-001, January 
2002)  
By developing and implementing a security mechanism that can 
dynamically adjust in accordance with a change to network modes and/or security levels, 
the users and managers do not have to be concerned with the fine granularity and low-
level complexity involved in adjusting and selecting appropriate security attributes, such 
as keylengths and cryptographic algorithms. 
b. User Choices for Security Levels 
Security classification levels are a common metric used in the government 
and DOD to distinguish authorization for classified information. Common levels include 
Top Secret, Secret, Classified and Unclassified.  Each of these levels correspond to 
different governing policies and requirements associated with the threat to national 
security by the disclosure of information to adversaries. Likewise, security selection 
levels, as defined here for proof of concept, represent an increasing requirement for 
stronger security (e.g. encryption and authentication algorithms).  
Network security policies may utilize a range of maximum and minimum-
security levels for each variant security service. Minimum-security levels set the lowest 
acceptable security attributes and maximum-security levels establish a ceiling on the use 
of available security resources. Intersections of policies require further granularity in 
security settings to satisfy all governing users and systems. A user may also desire to 
select a higher level of security than the predefined minimum. (NPS-CS-02-001, January 
2002)  
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A user or application, however, may quickly become overwhelmed with 
the security setting details, potentially resulting in degraded security or performance.  By 
developing security definitions that encompass detailed security settings required by 
users or applications, the complexity of the selection process for the security settings can 
be simplified to a reasonable level. One approach would involve the use of the following 
Network Security levels:  high, medium and low.  (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002)  
‘High’ security level would utilize strong levels of security attributes, medium level, 
moderate level of security attributes, and low level, low to no security attributes.  
By implementing this approach the system security resource manager or 
security engineer is responsible for presetting security variables and ranges in accordance 
with choices offered to users or applications. A mapping of allowable security settings to 
security levels, providing a range of selection or specific values, is required to properly 
enforce the system security policy.  (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002) 
c. The Notion of Network Modes 
Networks exist in a variety of states, providing users and systems with 
varying levels of service.  On one occasion the network may experience heavy levels of 
traffic resulting in a poor performance.  At other times the network may be limited in the 
availability of resources due to maintenance, and at other times the network may be 
performing at its optimum level. To fully incorporate the performance and reliability of 
the network into a Quality of Security Service mechanism, the notion of network modes 
is introduced.  
There are numerous situations in which a network security policy will be 
required to dynamically change to properly address the current operational threats and 
needs, as well as the availability of resources and network performance.  In the midst of a 
highly sensitive intelligence operation transmitted reports will require the highest 
possible security to ensure the information and the sources remain protected. In another 
scenario, an enterprise confronted with a serious emergency that requires the fastest 
possible transmissions may not be concerned with transmission protection.  (NPS-CS-02-
001, January 2002)  Therefore a requirement exists for a dynamic security mechanism 
that can appropriately adjust to meet the needs of the system, users or applications. One 
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approach is to use the following network modes: normal, impacted, and crisis. Normal 
mode is defined as ordinary operating conditions with normal traffic load and no 
heightened threat conditions. Impacted mode may be defined when the network/system is 
experiencing high levels of traffic and therefore certain security selection may not be 
available due to efficiency constraints.  Emergency mode may be defined as a situation 
that requires the highest level of security or the lowest level dependent on the situation 
and policy.  (NPS-CS-02-001, January 2002) 
d. Mapping Abstract Parameters to Security Mechanism 
A mapping of abstract dynamic parameters to resident security 
mechanisms is required to properly enforce policy decisions.  For example, network 



































Figure 9.   Mapping Security Policies to Security Attributes.  
(From Agar, Chris December 2001) 
 
The security resource manager and security engineer would define the 
network modes and security levels to provide the users and applications with appropriate 
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security service as translated into QoSS choices.  Once defined, the complexity of the 
security mechanism and security attribute selection is transparent to the user. (See Figure 
9)  
2. Implementation Issues 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) provides us with a mechanism to modulate the 
security settings and enhance performance based on both necessity (e.g. threat) and 
resource availability. It also provides us with a tool to ensure that the minimum-security 
requirements of applications and the network as proposed in the security policy is not 
violated. Hence defining an adaptive security policy based on network threat and 
performance conditions is the key to optimal and secure utilization of the network 
resources.  Keynote provides one such policy specification language but the complexity 
of the language makes its practical implementation extremely difficult. An abstraction for 
this language is therefore felt necessary. It would use the power of Keynote for formal 
compliance checking and at the same time be easy to use and administer. This is dealt 
with in the following chapters in detail.  
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III.  XML AND KEYNOTE POLICY LANGUAGE  
A. KEYNOTE POLICY SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE 
1. Introduction 
The syntax and semantics of the Keynote language is described in detail in RFC 
2704. (Blaze Matt, Feigenbaum, Joan, Ioannidis, John, and Keromytis, Angelos D). In 
this section a brief overview of the language and the specific parts that need emphasis 
will be highlighted.  The language is used for specifying application ‘policies,’ which 
govern the actions that principals (entities that can be authorized to perform actions) are 
authorized to perform. The language provides the semantics for describing ‘actions,’ 
which are operations with security consequences that are to be controlled by the system. 
It is also used for specifying ‘credentials’, which allow principals to delegate 
authorization to other principals. 
2. Keynote Assertion Syntax 
a. Basic Structure 
Keynote assertions are divided into sections, called ‘fields’ that serve 
various semantic functions. Each field starts with an identifying label at the beginning of 
a line, followed by the “:” character and the fields contents. There can be at most one 
field per line. 
A field may be continued over more than one line by indenting subsequent 
lines with at least one ASCII SPACE or TAB character.  Whitespace (a SPACE, TAB, or 
NEWLINE character) separates tokens but is otherwise ignored outside of indentation 
and quoted strings.   
One mandatory field is required in all assertions: 
• Authorizer 









All field names are case-insensitive.  The "KeyNote-Version" field, if 
present, appears first.  The "Signature" field, if present, appears last.  Otherwise, fields 
may appear in any order.  Each field may appear at most once in any assertion.   Blank 
lines are not permitted in assertions.  Multiple assertions are stored in a file (e.g., in 
application policy configurations), therefore, they can be separated from one another 
unambiguously by the use of blank lines between them. 
For the most part it is the conditions field that has many variables and a 
typical policy file will have a detailed conditions section. We shall examine the 
conditions field in detail as it applies to our application. 
 
b. Conditions Field 
The field gives the ‘conditions’ under which the Authorizer4 trusts the 
Licensees5 to perform an action.  The exact semantics of the field is defined in RFC 
2704. However parts of the language pertinent to our application are explained below. 
 Security attributes reside in the conditions section and are expressed in 
the form of logical statements. The conditions section’s syntax is similar to that of  a  
programming language “if statement”. The section is usually broken into sub statements 
by using &&, ||, and parenthesis to construct logical conditions. For example the 
following phrase describes two security proposals supporting Telnet services 
(service_port= 23) using ESP with 3DES for encryption and finger services 
(service_port=79) using AH with SHA for authentication: 
 (local_filter_port == “23” &&  
                                                 
4 The Authorizer identifies the Principal issuing the assertion. 
5 The Licensees identifies the principals authorized by the assertion.  More than one principal can be authorized, 
and  authorization can be distributed across several principals through the use of `and' and threshold constructs. 
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esp_present == "yes" && 
   esp_enc_alg == "3des") || 
 (local_filter_port == “79” &&  
ah_present == "yes" && 
   ah_auth_alg == "sha") -> “true”; 
 
3. Keynote Policy File 
A simple policy file may contain very few elements. For instance we consider an 
hypothetical application called “SPEND” wherein the authority is delegated authority to 
RSA key dab212. Further a condition is specified to permit delegation only when amount 
given in the "dollars" attribute is less than 10000. The policy would then look as under: 
Authorizer: "POLICY" 
Licensees: "RSA:dab212"  # the CFO's key 
Conditions:(app_domain=="SPEND")&&(@dollars  
< 10000); 
A more detailed policy is listed in Appendix ‘D’. 
4. Keynote Policy File with Quality of Service Parameters. 
Using the example in section 2(b) above, with security levels “high” and “low” 
and network modes “normal” and “impacted”, the condition phrase is expanded.  (From 
Agar, December 2001) 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Comment: Policy file for Network Modes and Security Levels 
Authorizer: "POLICY" 
Licensees: "passphrase:mekmitasdigoat" 
Conditions: ( (app_domain == "IPsec policy") && ( 
( (network_mode = “normal” &&  
((security_level = “high” && 
 ((local_filter_port == “23” &&  
esp_present == "yes" &&  
esp_enc_alg == "3des") || 
  (local_filter_port == “79” &&  
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ah_present == "yes" && 
     ah_auth_alg == "sha"))) || 
((security_level = “low” && 
 ((local_filter_port == “23” &&  
esp_present == "yes" &&  
esp_enc_alg == "des") || 
  (local_filter_port == “79” &&  
ah_present == "yes" && 
     ah_auth_alg == "des-mac")))) || 
(network_mode = “impacted” &&  
((security_level = “high” && 
 ((local_filter_port == “23” &&  
esp_present == "yes" &&  
esp_enc_alg == "aes") || 
  (local_filter_port == “79” &&  
ah_present == "yes" && 
     ah_auth_alg == "sha"))) || 
((security_level = “low” && 
 ((local_filter_port == “23” &&  
esp_present == "yes" &&  
esp_enc_alg == "3des") || 
  (local_filter_port == “79” &&  
ah_present == "yes" && 
     ah_auth_alg == "sha-md5")))) -> “true”; 
As we notice the complexity of the language increases exponentially as we add 
more ports and parameters to it. The nesting of parenthesis to multiple levels makes 
writing a syntactically correct policy file almost impossible. In the following section, 
XML is analyzed to see if the technology could be used to make the task of specifying 
the Keynote policy file practical. 
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B. XML  
1. Introduction 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a rapidly maturing technology with 
powerful real-world applications, particularly for the management, display and 
organization of data. XML is a technology concerned with the description and structuring 
of data. It is a subset of Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML), with the same 
goals, but with much less complexity. XML is not a language but a standard for creating 
languages that meet the XML criteria. It describes a syntax that you use to create your 
own languages (David Hunter, Kurt Cagle, Chris Dix, Roger Kovack, Jonathan Pinnock, 
Jeff Rafter February 2002). 
Data is separated from presentation in XML. XML structures the data,  while 
style sheets format the data presentation. That makes it easier to use the data for multiple 
purposes. The same stylesheet can be used with multiple documents to create a similar 
appearance among them. Or alternatively multiple stylesheets can be applied to an XML 
document to provide different forms of presentation of the data. There are a variety of 
languages that can be used to create stylesheets such as Extensible Stylesheet Language 
Transformations (XSLT).  
XML solves the problem that has been the focus of attention for many years now, 
data portability and software maintenance. Programmers have been structuring their data 
in an infinite variety of ways, and with every new way of structuring data comes much 
experimentation and testing to get it just right. If the data format changes, the 
methodologies to manipulate it also have to change, and the testing and tweaking has to 
begin again. The cycle of software maintenance will start all over again. With XML, 
there is a standardized way to structure the data and to extract the information we need. 
The extensibility of the language permits us to make changes, as we need without having 
to tweak adjust the code that extracts information from the file.  
2. XML Parsers 
XML documents have to be ‘well-formed’. Well-formed XML is XML that meets 
certain syntactical rules outlined in the XML 1.0 specification. Describing the documents 
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following these rules enables general-purpose XML programs called XML parsers to 
access the data from the document. XML parsers are programs that are able to read XML 
syntax and extract the tag names and the values i.e. the attributes and their values. There  
are two types of parsers, validating and non-validating parsers. Validating parsers in 
addition to parsing the data, also validate the data against the specified XML Schema or 
DTD. This ensures that the structure of the XML document as well as the data within it 
adheres to a predefined agreement or specification. 
There are a wide variety of well tested, industry strength parsers that we can use 
within our applications to access XML data. Thus applications designed to handle XML 
can inherit the properties of a well-tested parser and would not need to write all the code 
from scratch. Thus changes in the data format, as long as the data follows the XML 
standards, will not affect the application code. The parsers handle that for us. Even the 
language in which XML is written does not matter to the parsers. Thus if we create an 
XML document we can be sure that any XML parser will be able to retrieve information 
from that document, even if we can’t guarantee that any application will be able to 
understand what that information means. Examples of parsers include, Microsoft XML 
Parser (MSXML), Apache Xerces parser, IBM’s Xml4j parser, DOM, SAX etc.  
3. XML DTDs 
The need to validate documents against a vocabulary led the creators of XML to 
include a method of checking validity in the XML recommendation. A document is valid 
if its XML content complies with a definition of allowable elements, attributes and other 
document pieces. By utilizing special ‘Document Type Definition’ syntaxes or DTDs, 
you can check the content of a document type with a special parser. The Document Type 
Definition (DTD) validation format has been used for many years to validate SGML and 
XML documents. The XML recommendation separates parsers into two categories – 
validating and non-validating. Validating Parsers, according to the recommendation, must 
implement validity checking using DTDs., Therefore if we have a validating parser, we 
can remove the content checking code from our application and depend on the external 
processor. For instance you may use an XML software tool such as ‘XML-Spy’ to 
perform this check for you. Thus by utilizing DTDs, we can easily validate our XML 
documents against a defined vocabulary of elements and attributes. As the use of XML 
27 
and DTDs increased, some of the limitations of DTDs surfaced. Though these limitations 
restrict their use, DTDs are still useful for various applications. Some of the limitations of 
DTDs are: 
o DTDs were developed long before XML became a popular data transfer 
format. As a result, they do not follow the XML rules as XML schemas ( to be 
described later) do.  
o Support for XML Namespaces: Namespaces are used frequently in different 
types of XML documents to prevent naming conflicts. This allows elements 
that are used in different contexts to be combined without mixing up the 
meaning of the elements. By definition, an ‘XML namespace’ is a collection 
of names, identified by a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) reference 
[RFC2396], which are used in XML documents as element types and attribute 
names. DTDs have no concept of namespaces. In fact, most validating XML 
parsers allow you to "turn off" namespaces while validating an XML 
document against a DTD. XML schemas, on the other hand, fully support 
namespaces and do so well. 
o Poor data typing: DTDs have no real concept of data types. In fact, when you 
define an element in a DTD that contains a text node, you can only specify 
that the text node is Parsed Character Data (PCDATA). You cannot specify 
that the text must be a decimal, integer, date, and so on. Although DTD 
attribute definitions do contain a few more built-in data types such as ID, 
IDREF, and NMTOKEN, they still do not allow for validating against data 
types found in many relational databases. In contrast, XML schemas provide 
robust support for data types and also allow data types to be extended and 
customized. 
o Lack of the property of inheritance. 
However, with the release of XML schemas, a more powerful mechanism for 
validating XML documents is now available. 
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4. XML Schemas move to next page 
A Schema is the XML construct used to represent the data elements, attributes, 
and their relationships as defined in the data model. By definition, a DTD and a schema 
are very similar. However, DTDs usually define simple, abstract text relationships, while 
schemas define more complex and concrete data and application relationships. A DTD 
doesn't use a hierarchical formation, while a schema uses a hierarchical structure to 
indicate relationships. XML Schema definitions are also commonly referred to as XSD. 
Some of the benefits of XML Schemas are: 
o XML Schemas are created using XML, not an alternative SGML syntax. 
o XML Schemas fully support the Namespace Recommendation. The goal of 
the W3C XML namespaces recommendation was to create a mechanism in 
which elements and attributes within an XML document that were from 
different markup vocabularies could be unambiguously identified and 
combined without processing problems ensuing. The XML namespaces 
recommendation provided a method for partitioning various items within an 
XML document based on processing requirements without placing undue 
restrictions on how these items should be named. (Namespaces in XML, Jan 
1999). 
o XML Schemas allow you to validate text element content based on built-in 
and user-defined data types. 
o XML Schemas allow you to more easily create complex and reusable content 
models. 
o W3C XML Schema borrows a number of concepts from object oriented 
programming including the notions of abstract types, type substitutions, and 
polymorphism. Abstract elements and substitution groups allow schema 
authors to create or utilize schemas which define generic base types and 
extend these types without affecting the original schema. 
Data types in an XML Schema definition are of two broad categories: simple and 
complex. Elements that may contain attributes or other elements are ‘complexTypes’, 
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Attribute values and elements that contain only text content are ‘simpleTypes’. More 
commonly used simpleTypes, such as ‘int’, ‘float’ etc are built into XML Schemas, Data 
typing thus provides a rigid control on the input data. An XML document that adheres to 
a particular XML Schema is an XML Schema ‘instance’ document. Validating a 
document against an XML Schema requires the use of a special parser (Refer Figure 10). 
The XML Schema Recommendation calls these parsers ‘schema validators’. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Document validation with Schemas. 
 
5. XSLT 
XML lets us structure our data in a hierarchical structure. This structure has some 
rigid rules and following them enables us to use other XML tools to access and 
manipulate the data without having to write code for it. However the structure may not 
suit an application and we may need an alternative representation of the data for either 
presentation purposes or for the purpose of manipulating it. Extensible Stylesheet 
Language Transformations, XSLT, is a language which can transform XML documents 
into any text-based format, XML or otherwise. It is a sub-component of a larger language 
called XSL. XSL relies on finding parts of an XML document that match a series of 
predefined templates, and then applying transformation and formatting rules to each 
matched part.  Thus once an XML document is created, XSLT can be used to transform 
(XSD) 
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the document into whatever other format we wish- HTML for display on web sites, a 
different XML-based structure for other applications, or even just regular text files. 
XSL is used to create stylesheets. An XSL engine uses these stylesheets to 
transform XML documents into other document types, and to format the output. 
Stylesheets define the layout of the output document and the location of the data in the 
source document. That is, “retrieve data from this place in the input document; make it 
look like this in the output”. In XSL parlance, the input document is called the source 
tree, and the output document the result tree. 
XSLT is a declarative programming language as opposed to imperative 
programming languages like C++ or Java. It has no side effects and it has mechanisms to 
understand XML and HTML formats. XPATH is another W3C language specification 
that is used in conjunction with XSLT that allows us to address specific parts of an XML 
document and get the specific pieces of information that we need.  
 
6. Advantages of XML for the Policy Specification Language 
As described in Section IV we have a need to represent the intended IPsec policy 
in a form separate from the native KeyNote representation. Some of the advantages that 
would accrue by using XML are as follows: 
a. Tools 
Use of XML for specification of the KeyNote policy file lends itself to be 
used with the freely available, verified, tested and user-friendly tools. These tools include 
among others, XML editors, parsers, validators, translators etc. The availability of such 
tools and the extensive use of XML in modern communication protocols and other 
programs will enable users to manipulate XML files easily. Wide availability of such 
tools will also help in creating and maintaining the policy files over diverse systems 
without the need for an application specific editor. 
b. Security 
Interest in XML in recent years has resulted in huge investments in the 
field of XML security. The XML security features such as XML encryption and 
authentication will enhance the security of the policy file. This will also help, for 
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instance, in selectively ‘digitally signing’ parts of the policy file. Thus a person signing a 
particular part of the policy file will only be responsible for the part he signed. Without 
the XML format it would be possible only to sign the entire file after for instance adding 
a part to it.  
c. Platform Independence 
It is possible to edit, maintain and distribute the XML policy file across 
different OS platforms. 
d. Single Data Multiple Presentation  
 Once we represent the policy in an XML format it is possible to extract 
relevant information and present it in different forms that are more intuitive and useful to 
the administrator or the user. XSLT style sheets can be written and associated with the 
policy file to generate different presentation formats. Apart from presenting it in a more 
understandable and probably graphic format this will also help the administrator pin 
down any inaccuracies/inconsistencies/contradictions in the policy file. Intelligent agents 
can be written to audit the policy file and signal the administrator for errors in the policy 
file. 
e. Consistency and Accuracy 
XML Schemas and/or DTDs can be used to validate the XML file to see if 
it matches our specifications. Validating the policy file with a well-defined schema will 
enable errors to be picked up. This will trap all errors without having to go through the 
entire file manually. The use of generic schema generators and validators only makes this 
an easier task. This will also enable users to verify policy files received across the 
networks.  
f. Extensible Format  
An XML format will lend itself to extend the policy file to cater to new 
requirements in the policy file that come up in the future. Additional tags can be defined 
for elements and attributes as and when the need to incorporate them arises. This would 
not require changes to the application code as long as the structure of the document is 
maintained.  
g. Ease of Use Move down 
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The hierarchical nature of XML layout results in an easy to use and easy 
to manipulate format. It makes the file more modular and so easily understandable. 
h Semantic Content Use:  
The semantic content of the policy file enables future deployment of 
intelligent agents or roaming agents that can read policy files and report problems, and 
that can resolve conflicts between multiple systems by highlighting for instance the 
difference in the policies between them. 
 
C. INTEGRATING XML AND KEYNOTE POLICY  
The Keynote engine requires that the assertions, credentials and the policy files be 
specified in the syntax as specified in RFC 2704 and examined in section ‘A’ above. This 
structure restricts our ability to define any meaningful network security policy in an error 
free manner. Further, any policy file received in this format is not human readable, thus 
establishing a daunting requirement to verify its correctness and to detect security 
loopholes if any.  Thus there is a clear problem of differentiation between data content 
and its representation. The same data is required by the Keynote engine in one format 
while on the other hand the format is not suited for human interpretation and validation. 
This is where it is felt that XML could be brought in. Specifying the policy data in an 
XML format will enable us to use XSL to translate the data to the format needed. XSL 
could also be used to present the data a more human readable form. Further specifying an 
XML Schema would provide us the benefit of validating the XML policy file for 
correctness prior to its transformation. 
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IV.  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A. DESIGN METHODOLOGY 
The design of the policy editor was done in the following major steps: 
1. Study the existing keynote policy language. 
2. List out the alternative approaches to design. 
3. Examine XML and evaluate design alternatives using XML. 
4. Design of a Java based GUI. 
5. Integration of various components. 
 
B. ALTERNATIVE DESIGN APPROACHES 
Two design approaches were studied and implemented. These are as below: 
1. Option 1: Non XML Version  
We shall look at the ‘conditions’ field of the policy file in the following 
discussion. The first option considered was to use any high level programming language 
to develop a graphical user interface that takes user inputs and converts it into the 
Keynote policy. This approach is extremely difficult to implement due to the complexity 
of the policy specification language. However preliminary research led to the observation 
that representing the user’s policy data in a consistent data structure would enable easy 
processing of the data for writing out the Boolean expressions of the KeyNote file. The 
appropriate data structure for one such implementation and the algorithm for the 
application code is given in the succeeding paragraphs. 
a. Data Structure 
A ‘tree’ data structure is selected for the storage of the choices for the 
conditions field of the policy file (Refer Figure 11). A constraint wherein the children of 
any node meet an OR condition is enforced. The parent is then ‘ANDed’ to the ‘ORed’ 
children. For  example, a condition specified as below would have an equivalent tree 
structure as shown: 
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o Condition Statement 
((security_level==‘high’)&&((remote_filter_port ==21)|| (local_filter_port 
== 21)) ..   
o Tree structure 
 
Figure 11.   Tree Layout of a Condition Statement. 
 
b. The Algorithm: 
An algorithm for generating KeyNote policy file from the user’s tree 
structured policy data was implemented in Java. The algorithm is as below: 
Function Generate_policy: Parameters Node, Returns String 
// this is a recursive program that generates a document in the KeyNote  
// format reading the policy data from a tree structured policy file. 
Begin 
If node = = leaf node 
Begin 
Read attribute name 
Read attribute value 
Set node_string = (attribute name == ‘ attribute value’ ) 




  Read attribute name 
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  Read attribute value 
 Set parent_string = (attribute name == ‘ attribute value’) 
  Set child_count =0;  
  For each child_node 
   Begin 
    child_count = child_count+1;  
   If child_count ==1 //first child 
  first_child_string 
  = Generate_policy(child_node); 
   ElseIf child_count ==2 
   Begin 
child_string 
              = Generate_policy(child_node); 
Set combined_string = 
(first_child_string ||   child_string 
End 
     Else 
Set combined_string = combined_string || 
child_string 
          
    EndIf 
       End 
      Set node_string = (parent_string && (child_string) 
      Return node_string; 
 End  
 EndIf 
    End 
 
c. Advantages of the Solution 
This program produces the desired result and has a few merits as under: 
o This solution results in simple application code. The code is mainly the 
recursive code along with other graphic components.  
o The complexity of the code is O(log n) , where n is the number of leaf 
nodes. This is due to the representation of the policy in a tree structure. 
36 
However since the tree need not be balanced it may not be extremely 
efficient. (Aho, Hopcroft and  Ullman, 1987) 
d.  Shortcomings of the Solution 
o The constraint imposed on the data structure works well with our 
current need of the policy file but may not suit all the future needs.  
o It may be hard if not impossible to represent any arbitrary policy in a 
format that maintains the structure constraint. 
o It does not solve the problem of auditing, consistency checks and 
validation of the stated policy. As the final form of the file is in 
keynote policy format, it is not possible to analyze the content of the 
file in a practical manner 
e. Implementation and Evaluation 
o The solution was implemented in Java and successfully generates the 
desired keynote policy file. 
o Due to the major drawbacks of the solution of extensibility and 
validation the solution is not considered a viable practical solution 
though it meets the current needs. 
2. Option 2:  Defining an XML Policy File Format 
The alternative was to look at an alternate representation of the policy logic in the 
form of a “ user policy file”. The research in coming to the algorithm for option one 
demonstrates the utility of a tree structured users policy file format. Further, the typical 
hierarchical nature of the policy file also points towards a tree structure. Use of XML 
thus seemed the logical step forward. Hence the overall approach for this option was to 
come up with format for the user policy file and then possibly transform that to the native 
KeyNote policy file format. This approach also provides the flexibility of extracting 
useful administrative information from the user policy file. All the advantages of using 
XML as described earlier in Section III.B.6 would also apply.  
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C. XML POLICY FILE 
Arriving at a format for the user policy file is a challenging task and there are 
multiple options available. The only fixed requirement is that the resulting XML file be 
well formed. During the course of the thesis research, multiple formats were designed. 
Each format had its strengths and shortcomings. For instance one format would lend itself 
to an easy application design while another would add more semantic content in the file 
format. The former therefore makes it easier to write an application such as a ‘Policy 
Editor’ while the latter results in a more descriptive self-defining file, which could be a 
good interchange format between multiple applications for instance. However after 
multiple iterations of modifications to the file format it is my opinion that the format does 
not matter as long as it has enough semantic content to make it understandable to the 
reader. I say this, as the choice of element tag names, their sequence etc. is a personal 
preference and the power of XSL is always available for another user who wishes to use 
an alternative format to transform the file to the format that he desires. Thus arriving at a 
well annotated, self-defining and logical policy file format was the endeavor.  
Several choices had to be made. For instance a conditional statement like, 
(network_mode == ‘normal’ && ( security_level ==’high’)) could be represented in 
many different formats. If the operators are implicit in the representation then we could 
for instance represent it in formats as in option 1-3 below or to reveal various types of 
Boolean operators we could follow the fourth or fifth option.  








o Option 2 – Use of Attributes  
<network_mode value =’normal’>  
<security_level value = ‘high’> 
</security_level> 
 </network_mode> 
o Option 3 – Generic nodes 
<element tagname = ‘network_mode’ value = ‘normal’> 
 <element tagname = ‘security_level’ value = ‘high’> 
 </element> 
</element> 
o Option 4 – Define the operators to be used. To write a policy file to represent 
a complex Boolean expression such as – ((network_mode == ‘normal’)&& 
((security_level == ‘high’) || (security_level == ‘low’))), we could represent 
the same using XML as under: 
<operator value = ‘&&’>  <!--Note prefix usage --> 
<network network_mode = ‘normal’> 
  <operator value = ‘||’> 
   <security security_level ==’high’/> 
   <security security_level ==’low’/> 
   </operator> 
 </network> 
 </operator> 
o Option 5 – Infix notation 
<network network_mode = ‘normal’> 
<operator value = ‘&&’> 
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 <security security_level ==’high’/> 
   <operator value = ‘||’/> 
 <security security_level ==’low’/> 
</operator> 
</network> 
These are only a few possible representations of the file format. The options 1-3 
make the application code simpler by making the operators implicit in the representation. 
However they do not lend themselves to extending to future needs by allowing other 
Boolean operations. The fourth and fifth operations make it possible to extend the format 
to any possible policy representation. However the writing the application code would 
require a little more detail and  effort.  As stated earlier any format is acceptable provided 
we support translations to the formats desired and that is the power of XML. 
Representation of the data should not hinder its use in any way. 
The XML policy file that was finally arrived at is shown in Appendix ‘A’. 
D. XSL     
Having arrived at the XML policy file format XSL stylesheets had to be written to 
transform the policy file into desired formats. Two stylesheets were designed using 
XSLT (Refer Figure 12).  
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Figure 12.   XSL Transformation of XML Policy Data in the User Policy File. 
 The stylesheet for  transforming the file to the Keynote policy file format is as 
shown in Appendix ‘B’. The result of transforming the XML policy file this stylesheet is 
shown in Appendix D.  An alternative stylesheet to transform the XML policy file to a 
more human readable, graphical web based format was also written. This is provided in 
Appendix C. The transformed output of the XML Policy file using this template is shown 
in Figure 17.  
 
E. JAVA BASED GUI 
Though XML provides us with the flexibility to edit the policy file in any XML 
editor, it would still be convenient to provide a graphical user interface to manipulate the 
policy file. This would help in eliminating inadvertent errors and would also provide an 
automated entry into multiple elements without the need to edit each element content. 
This would enable global policy decisions to be applied throughout the policy file. An 
experienced system administrator could still capitalize on the use of the XML policy 
format and edit the file in the absence of the graphical user interface (GUI). 
A Java-based GUI was therefore built to integrate various components of the 
software. Drop down menus and dialog boxes guide the user to input various parameters 
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required for the policy file. To enable maintenance of the GUI, from now on called the 
Policy-Editor, a separate XML configuration file was used to feed the data for various 
drop down menus and combo/list boxes. This decoupling of the Java code from the 
configuration data will enable continued use of the Policy-Editor without the need to 
modify the Java code.  
The application uses the Java Document Object Model  (JDOM) and Simple API 
for XML (SAX) packages to read, modify and translate XML files. JDOM beta 8 release 
was used and is available from http://www.JDOM.org  
The application has been broadly divided into two modules the Admin module 
and the Operational Settings module. The Admin module caters for changes made 
infrequently and which provide the administrator to enter major changes to the policy file 
easily. The changes made in this menu option are saved in the config.xml file and will 
also result in changes to the entries in the combo/list boxes that appear under the 
operational settings. In other words, only entries that are allowed by the admin module 
will be available for further granular changes in the operational settings module. For 
instance if port 21 is opened using the Port-Management menu option under the admin 
menu then it would be possible to make further granular changes to Port 21 using the 
operational settings options. This may be for instance enable ESP with DES encryption 
for port 21. 
Figures 13 to 16 are screen shots of the Policy Editor. Figure 13 and Figure 14 use 
the admin module to select ports and operational modes and security levels respectively. 
Figures 15 and 16 show the granular settings of encryption and authentication for 
particular ports. Figure 17 shows how the XSL transformation of the policy file displays 





Figure 13.   Managing Ports in the Admin Module. 
 
 














F. XML SPY – AN XML EDITOR 
 XML Spy Suite from Altova, Copyright ©1998-2002 Altova GmbH, is a 
comprehensive and easy-to-use product family that facilitates all aspects of XML 
Application Development. The product family consists of the XML Spy Document 
Framework and XML Spy IDE. XML Spy Document Framework consists of XSLT 
Designer and XML Spy Document Editor. The XSLT Designer enables writing of 
complex XSLT Stylesheets using an intuitive drag-and-drop user interface. XSLT 
Designer creates forms for use with XML Spy Document Editor. XSLT Designer was 
however not used for the purpose of writing the stylesheets for the policy editor, as they 
were too complex to be handled by the Designer. XML Spy Document Editor is a word 
processor type editor, supporting electronic form-based data input, graphical elements, 
tables, as well as real-time validation using XML Schema. XML Spy IDE is an integrated 
solution for XML-based application development, allowing easy creation and 
management of XML documents, XML schemas, as well as XSLT Stylesheets XML-Spy 
was used in the development of the XML Policy file. Figure 18 is a screen shot depicting 
the use of XML Spy editor. It displays how in the absence of the policy editor, the XML 
Spy (or any such editor) could be used to manipulate the XML Policy file directly. The 
result of schema validation can also be seen here. Figure 19 is the design view of the 




















The security policy management toolkit thus comprises of the Java based Policy-
Editor and an XML editor such as XML Spy, XML Notepad etc. The XML editors are 
not essential and only aid in manipulating the files and transforming them to multiple 
forms. The XML editors enable schema validation and also provide tools for 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
49 
V. RESEARCH SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
Security policy management is a critical issue in the management of computer and 
networking resources. IPsec and Keynote provide a mechanism to implement a granular 
security policy. Previous research in the area of ‘Quality of Security Service’ 
demonstrates how an adaptive security policy can provide enhanced security with optimal 
utilization of network resources. The only missing link in the process is the difficulty in 
specifying a well-defined, granular, error free and consistent security policy in the 
language understood by the Keynote trust management engine. This thesis was aimed at 
finding a solution to this problem by way of developing an easy to use yet powerful 
security policy editor. The thesis demonstrates that use of XML technology as a middle 
layer provides us with a means to combine the complexity of Keynote with the simplicity 
of a policy editor. This novel approach also provides us all the benefits of XML, such as 
XSL and XML security. While XSL was extensively used, XML security tools could be 
used as follow up future work.  
 
B.  SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PERFORMED IN THIS THESIS 
The thesis involved thorough study and implementation of concepts from a wide 
variety of areas. Extensive programming in Java and integration with the emerging XML 
technologies was achieved. Concepts from computer security, networking and 
programming languages were studied and adapted to meet the requirement set forth in the 
thesis, i.e. security-policy management. A fully functional XML based Policy-Editor was 
developed and tested. In particular the thesis involved the following: 
• Study of IPsec and Keynote Trust Management System, 
• Understanding of Quality of Security Service Concepts, 
• In depth understanding of different XML technologies, 
• Development of human intuitive representation of complex low level policy 
structures, 
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• Introducing a novel approach to Security Policy management using XML, and  
• Extensive Java and XML programming. 
 
C. FUTURE WORK 
Security policy management is a vast area and the research done in this thesis can 
be complemented with additional work in a number of areas to provide better tools for 
policy management. Listed below are several major items that will require attention. 
1. Policy File Format 
The XML policy file format currently specified could benefit from a more 
elaborate format with tags for other parameters. XML Namespaces and XML 
vocabularies could be utilized for a more comprehensive policy format. Different 
possible combinations of security attributes need to be taken into consideration in the 
policy specification. Examples of further implementation could involve incorporating 
other parameters such as algorithm key length, time-of-day parameters etc. As explained 
in Section IV(C), the policy format should be able to accommodate other Boolean 
operators such as inequality definitions ( <, >, != )  in the security policy management 
mechanism.  For example, esp_enc_alg > DES could imply 3DES and AES if we have an 
ordering for the ‘security strength’ of each algorithm. Global policy statements such as 
encryption in crisis mode < 3DES, etc. should be possible. Inclusion of IP addresses in 
policy statements should also be made possible. The concepts for these have been 
demonstrated in the implementation and other options analyzed in various chapters. 
Addition of more parameters as stated above would however open up possibilities for 
inconsistencies in policy statements and the same will have to be carefully and formally 
worked out. 
2. Schema Design and RELAX NG  
W3C XML Schemas are complicated and hard to formulate. The schema 
generated in this thesis was automatically generated by XML Spy and modified manually 
to suit our current requirement. This schema language is very complex and permits us to 
define complex content models. The schema for instance could be made more specific or 
more general. This would depend on how we intend to formulate the policy statements. 
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Future work could therefore focus on how a detailed policy encompassing various 
parameters  such as IP addresses, encryption attributes etc could be specified. The 
interrelationship between different elements could also be specified, such as if ‘Crisis’ 
mode uses encryption then so should ‘Normal’ and ‘Impacted’ mode. In exploring more 
usage of Schema, alternate schema languages such as RELAX NG could be tried. This 
new language is gaining popularity due its simplicity and robustness. RELAX NG is the 
result of merging two popular schema languages: RELAX and TREX. The RELAX NG 
language is very similar to the W3C XML Schema language. RELAX NG has a much 
stronger foundation in mathematical models, which allows programmers to create highly 
optimized validation tools. In addition, RELAX NG omits many features that make W3C 
XML Schemas difficult to learn. RELAX NG, like W3C XML Schemas, is written in an 
XML Syntax and requires you to define the allowable elements and attributes within your 
instance documents. RELAX NG can be found on the Web at http://relaxng.org.  
3. Policy Editor Enhancements 
The policy editor interface though complete and functional can be improved upon. 
The particular improvements envisaged are as follows: 
o Data Binding. 
Data Binding is a concept where XML data can be read into applications as 
objects. By accessing the data as Java objects, manipulation becomes faster and 
managing large policy files would not slow down the system. Through the use of 
data binding the policy editor could be made more efficient and faster.  
o Global policy settings. 
The policy editor could be modified to enable global policy settings. For 
instance we could have a statement such as all ports should have a minimum 
encryption of DES or the maximum encryption algorithm for Crisis mode should 
not exceed 3DES etc. The global settings option could enter the default settings 
for all permissible ports and then more granular changes could be made 
o Help. 
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Help to guide the user to form syntactically correct policy statements and 
correct use of GUI could make the editor more complete. Context sensitive help 
could also be added 
o Translation and viewing XML. 
XML translation and viewing currently need the help of any general purpose 
XML editor. Using Java packages such as Javax, the same could be incorporated 
into the GUI thus dispensing the need for XML editors for translation.  
o Schema validation. 
Validation of the XML document against DTD and Schema need to be 
incorporated into the GUI. The same is currently done using an XML tool such as 
XML Spy. DOM/JDOM/SAX could be used for the purpose. 
o Inconsistency and contradiction checks. 
As the policy file is extended to include global parameters and overlapping 
rules apply to a particular port or application, inconsistencies and contradictions 
would begin to emerge. The same would have to be considered and avoided. 
Various XML tools could help in achieving this. Distributed IPsec policy when 
considered would also give rise to multiple issues of policy consistencies. 
o Improvement in the look and feel of the user interface. 
The look and feel of the editor can always be improved to cater for user 
preferences and to avoid chances of introducing inadvertent errors. Context 
sensitive tool tips, toolbars and help could all be incorporated into the policy 
editor to give it a complete look. 
3. XML Interface to Keynote 
It is felt that extending the XML policy language specified in this thesis to a 
broader XML specification and providing an XML processor in the Keynote engine itself 
would greatly enhance the use of Keynote.  This would probably reduce the overhead of 
parsing in Keynote and provide the power of XML to it for better auditing and dynamic 
management of trust. XML security features could also be incorporated. For instance 
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using XML signature, a user can sign for parts of the XML document i.e. a subset of the 
‘Elements’. Thus making him accountable for the parts signed by him only. By providing 
an XML interface to Keynote, application users could define their own versions of the 
policy language and use XSL for translating it into the desired Keynote format, which 
would be trivial, or alternatively they could use the vocabulary specified in the Keynote 
specifications. 
 
D.  CONCLUSION  
This thesis proves the concept of using XML for management of security policy. 
A Policy-Editor based on these concepts was designed and developed. Software design 
and development is ever evolving and this chapter highlights various areas for future 
work and enhancements. These should eventually lead to complete utilization of the 
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APPENDIX A.  XML POLICY FILE 
A sample XML Policy file, with various permissible parameters is as follows:  
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!-- edited with XML Spy v4.4 U by Raj Mohan) --> 
<Policy xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
 <!--  href="C:\XMLProject\currentPolicyXMLXSL\KeynotePolicyModified02JunXSL.xsl" --> 
 <KeyNoteVersion><![CDATA[KeyNote-Version: 2 
  ]]></KeyNoteVersion> 
 <Comment><![CDATA[Comment: Policy file for Network modes and Security Levels in XML Format 
  ]]></Comment> 
 <Authorizer><![CDATA[Authorizer: "POLICY" 
  ]]></Authorizer> 
 <Licensees><![CDATA[Licensees: "passphrase:mekmitasdigoat" 
  ]]></Licensees>  
 <Conditions> 
  <ApplicationDomain app_domain="IPsec policy"> 
   <NetworkMode network_mode="normal"> 
    <SecurityLevel security_level="low"> 
     <Port local_filter_port="21" remote_filter_port="21"> 
      <Encapsulation esp_present="yes"> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des3" /> 
      </Encapsulation> 
     </Port> 
     <Port local_filter_port="23" remote_filter_port="23"> 
      <Encapsulation esp_present="yes"> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des-iv64" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des3" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="idea3" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des-iv32" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="aes" /> 
      </Encapsulation> 
      <Ah ah_present="yes"> 
       <AuthenticationAlgorithm ah_auth_alg="hmac-sha" /> 
       <AuthenticationAlgorithm ah_auth_alg="des-mac" /> 
      </Ah> 
     </Port> 
     <Port local_filter_port="100" remote_filter_port="100"> 
      <Encapsulation esp_present="yes"> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des-iv64" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des3" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des-iv32" /> 
       <AuthenticationAlgorithm esp_auth_alg="hmac-md5" /> 
       <AuthenticationAlgorithm esp_auth_alg="hmac-sha" /> 
      </Encapsulation> 
      <Ah ah_present="yes"> 
       <AuthenticationAlgorithm ah_auth_alg="hmac-md5" /> 
       <AuthenticationAlgorithm ah_auth_alg="hmac-sha" /> 
      </Ah> 
     </Port> 
    </SecurityLevel> 
    <SecurityLevel security_level="medium"> 
     <Port local_filter_port="21" remote_filter_port="21"> 
      <Encapsulation esp_present="yes"> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des3" /> 
       <EncryptionAlgorithm esp_enc_alg="des-iv32" /> 
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      </Encapsulation> 
     </Port> 
    </SecurityLevel> 
    <SecurityLevel security_level="high" /> 
   </NetworkMode> 
   <NetworkMode network_mode="impacted"> 
    <SecurityLevel security_level="low" /> 
    <SecurityLevel security_level="medium" /> 
    <SecurityLevel security_level="high" /> 
   </NetworkMode> 
   <NetworkMode network_mode="crisis"> 
    <SecurityLevel security_level="low" /> 
    <SecurityLevel security_level="medium" /> 
    <SecurityLevel security_level="high" /> 
   </NetworkMode> 
  </ApplicationDomain> 
 </Conditions> 
 <Dummy><![CDATA[ 












APPENDIX B.  KEYNOTE POLICY TEMPLATE 
The following is the XSL stylesheet that transforms the XML Policy file into the 
KeyNote Policy file syntax. 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"> 
 <xsl:output method="text" version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" indent="yes"/> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- root template --> 
 <!-- apply the templates for all the children of the /policy node --> 
 <!-- just call for each child .. hence can add more children to the source tree and only need to add the 
corresponding template here or let it use the default template --> 
 <xsl:template match="/"> 
  <xsl:apply-templates/> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- root template --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- GENERIC TOP LEVEL  TEMPLATE  *****************************************--> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- generic  template for all other children of policy --> 
 <xsl:template match="/Policy/*" priority=".8"> 
  <xsl:value-of select="."/> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- children of policy  template --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- CONDITIONS TEMPLATE  ********************************************************** --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- conditions  template --> 
 <xsl:template match="/Policy/Conditions" priority=" 0.5"> 
  <!-- start the opening brackets for the conditions  clause --> 
  <xsl:text>Conditions: ( </xsl:text> 
  <!-- Handle the ApplicationDomain element .. print its attribute and values in a bracket --> 
  <xsl:for-each select="child::ApplicationDomain"> 
   <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <!-- for each network mode, open a bracket enter the attribute name = value close  --> 
  <!-- the bracket and place the operator && and then call the template for the level children --> 
  <!-- after the call close the bracket --> 
  <!-- if the node is not the first node or if it had precedent-siblings which were also of --> 
  <!-- network node type then place an || before starting the first bracket --> 
  <!-- || ( (network_mode == normal) && --> 
  <xsl:for-each select="ApplicationDomain/NetworkMode"> 
   <!-- first network node to be handled here --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::NetworkMode) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> &amp;&amp; </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
    <!-- handle all children of network node here --> 
    <xsl:for-each select="SecurityLevel"> 
     <!-- first SecurityLevel node to be handled here --> 
     <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::SecurityLevel) = 0)"> 
      <xsl:text> &amp;&amp; </xsl:text> 
      <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
      <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
      <!-- handle children of SecurityLevel here --> 
      <!-- children here --> 
     </xsl:if> 
     <!--end if securtiyLevel node is the first one --> 
     <!-- except first case preceed with an or symbol --> 
     <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::SecurityLevel) > 0)"> 
      <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
      <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
      <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
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      <!-- handle children of SecurityLevel here --> 
      <!-- children here --> 
     </xsl:if> 
     <!-- last SecurityLevel node to be handled here close bracket --> 
     <xsl:if test="(count(following-sibling::SecurityLevel) = 0)"/> 
     <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
    </xsl:for-each> 
    <!-- for all levels --> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!-- if network node is the first one --> 
   <!-- except first case preceed with an or symbol --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::NetworkMode) > 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
    <!-- handle all children of network node here --> 
    <xsl:for-each select="SecurityLevel"> 
     <!-- first SecurityLevel node to be handled here --> 
     <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::SecurityLevel) = 0)"> 
      <xsl:text> &amp;&amp; </xsl:text> 
      <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
      <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
      <!-- handle children of SecurityLevel here --> 
      <!-- children here --> 
     </xsl:if> 
     <!--end if securtiyLevel node is the first one --> 
     <!-- except first case preceed with an or symbol --> 
     <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::SecurityLevel) > 0)"> 
      <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
      <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
      <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
      <!-- handle children of SecurityLevel here --> 
      <!-- children here --> 
     </xsl:if> 
     <!-- last SecurityLevel node to be handled here close bracket --> 
     <xsl:if test="(count(following-sibling::SecurityLevel) = 0)"/> 
     <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
    </xsl:for-each> 
    <!-- for all levels --> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!-- last network node to be handled here close bracket --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(following-sibling::NetworkMode) = 0)"/> 
   <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <!-- end network nodes --> 
  <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- conditions  template --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- CONDITIONS TEMPLATE  *********************************************************** --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- conditions  template --> 
 <xsl:template match="/Policy/Conditions" priority="1"> 
  <!-- start the opening brackets for the conditions  clause --> 
  <xsl:text>Conditions: </xsl:text> 
  <!-- Handle the ApplicationDomain element .. print its attribute and values in a bracket --> 
  <xsl:for-each select="child::ApplicationDomain"> 
   <xsl:call-template name="appDomainContent"/> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <xsl:text>-> "true";</xsl:text> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!--  NAMED TEMPLATE FOR APPLICATION DOMAIN   ************************************ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- ( (app_domain == "IPsec policy") && ( (netwokmode1) || (networkmode2) ... ) ) --> 
 <xsl:template name="appDomainContent"> 
  <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
  <xsl:for-each select="NetworkMode"> 
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   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::NetworkMode) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> &amp;&amp; </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="networkModeContent"/> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!--end if NetworkMode node is the first one --> 
   <!-- except first case preceed with an or symbol --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::NetworkMode) > 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="networkModeContent"/> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!-- last NetworkModel node to be handled here close bracket --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(following-sibling::NetworkMode) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
   </xsl:if> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <!-- end for each NetworkMode --> 
  <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- end appDomainContent template --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!--  NAMED TEMPLATE FOR NETWORK MODE  ************************************ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- ( (network_mode == "normal") && ( (security1) || (seucurity2) ... ) ) --> 
 <xsl:template name="networkModeContent"> 
  <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
  <xsl:for-each select="SecurityLevel"> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::SecurityLevel) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> &amp;&amp; </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="securityContent"/> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!--end if SecurityLevel node is the first one --> 
   <!-- except first case preceed with an or symbol --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::SecurityLevel) > 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="securityContent"/> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!-- last securityLevel node to be handled here close bracket --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(following-sibling::SecurityLevel) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
   </xsl:if> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <!-- end for each securityLevel --> 
  <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- end network mode template --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!--  NAMED TEMPLATE FOR SECURITY  ************************************ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- ( (security_level == "low") && ( (port1) || (port2) ... ) ) --> 
 <xsl:template name="securityContent"> 
  <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
  <xsl:for-each select="Port"> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::Port) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> &amp;&amp; </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="portContent"/> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!--end if Port node is the first one --> 
   <!-- except first case preceed with an or symbol --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::Port) > 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="portContent"/> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!-- last Port node to be handled here close bracket --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(following-sibling::Port) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
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   </xsl:if> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <!-- end for each Port --> 
  <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!--  NAMED TEMPLATE FOR PORT  ************************************ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- outcome : take the two attributes local port num and remote port number and or them in a bracket --> 
 <!-- and and it with the templates of its children i.ed encapsulation and Ah ored --> 
 <!-- e.g ( ( (local_port == "23") || (remote_port == "23") ) && ( (encapsulation) || (authentication) ) ) --> 
 <xsl:template name="portContent"> 
  <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:call-template name="portTwoAttributeContent"/> 
  <xsl:text> &amp;&amp; </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:for-each select="Encapsulation"> 
   <!-- Encapsulation node to be handled here --> 
   <xsl:call-template name="encapsulationOrAh"/> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <!-- for all encryption algorithms  --> 
  <xsl:for-each select="Ah"> 
   <!--Ah node to be handled here --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::Encapsulation) > 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <xsl:call-template name="encapsulationOrAh"/> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- port  template --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- GENERIC NAMED TWO ATTRIBUTE TEMPLATE  ************************************ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- generic named template will print the attrbute and its value inside a bracket --> 
 <!-- TODO need to check if it has more than needed attribute then only apply to the first one --> 
 <!-- eg output ((local_filter_port == "23" ) || (local_filter_port == "23" ))   of the context nodes attribute --> 
 <xsl:template name="portTwoAttributeContent" priority=".8"> 
  <xsl:text>( </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:for-each select="@local_filter_port"> 
   <xsl:text>( </xsl:text> 
   <xsl:value-of select="local-name()"/> 
   <xsl:text> == </xsl:text> 
   <xsl:text>"</xsl:text> 
   <xsl:value-of select="."/> 
   <xsl:text>"</xsl:text> 
   <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:for-each select="@remote_filter_port"> 
   <xsl:text>( </xsl:text> 
   <xsl:value-of select="local-name()"/> 
   <xsl:text> == </xsl:text> 
   <xsl:text>"</xsl:text> 
   <xsl:value-of select="."/> 
   <xsl:text>"</xsl:text> 
   <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <xsl:text>) </xsl:text> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- children of policy  template --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!--  NAMED TEMPLATE FOR ENCAPSULATION OR AH ************************************ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- outcome should be ( (esp_present == "yes") && ( .. call for each encryption algo.. with ors in between then 
&& then call for auth and close ) --> 
 <!--  (  (esp_present == "yes") && |  ( (enc1) || (enc2) ) && ((ah1)||(ah2)) |  ) --> 
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 <!-- TODO check for inconsistency ... ie esp_present == yes but no enc alg specified --> 
 <xsl:template name="encapsulationOrAh"> 
  <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
  <xsl:text> &amp;&amp; </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:text> (</xsl:text> 
  <!-- open a ( and call for each algorithm where type = encryption and put ors in between and close 
with ) --> 
  <xsl:for-each select="EncryptionAlgorithm"> 
   <!-- first encryption algorithm node to be handled here --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::EncryptionAlgorithm) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text>( </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="algorithm"/> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!--end if encryptionnode is the first one --> 
   <!-- except first case preceed with an or symbol --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::EncryptionAlgorithm) > 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="algorithm"/> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!-- last encryption algorithm  node to be handled here close bracket --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(following-sibling::EncryptionAlgorithm) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text>) </xsl:text> 
   </xsl:if> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <!-- for all encryption algorithms  --> 
  <!-- insert && between encryption and auth types--> 
  <xsl:if test="(count(child::EncryptionAlgorithm) > 0)"> 
   <xsl:text> &amp;&amp; </xsl:text> 
  </xsl:if> 
  <!-- open a ( and call for each algorithm where type = authentication and put ors in between and 
close with ) --> 
  <xsl:for-each select="AuthenticationAlgorithm"> 
   <!-- first authentication algorithm node to be handled here --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::AuthenticationAlgorithm) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text>( </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="algorithm"/> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!--end if encryptionnode is the first one --> 
   <!-- except first case preceed with an or symbol --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::AuthenticationAlgorithm) > 0)"> 
    <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
    <xsl:call-template name="algorithm"/> 
   </xsl:if> 
   <!-- last authentication algorithm  node to be handled here close bracket --> 
   <xsl:if test="(count(following-sibling::AuthenticationAlgorithm) = 0)"> 
    <xsl:text>) </xsl:text> 
   </xsl:if> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <!-- for all authentication algorithms  --> 
  <!-- final closing of all the brackets --> 
  <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!--  NAMED TEMPLATE FOR ALGORITHM AND ITS ATTRIBUTES****************** --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- outcome when called in the context of encryptionAlgorithm node --> 
 <!--  ( (esp_enc_alg == "DES)&&  (  (esp_key_length == "128) )( (esp_key_length == "128) .. )  ) --> 
 <!-- caller need not enclose these in a bracket  --> 
 <!-- call one such for each algorithm --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- template forEncryptionAlgorithm --> 
 <xsl:template name="algorithm" priority=".8"> 
  <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
  <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
  <xsl:for-each select="Attribute"> 
    
     <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::Attribute) = 0)"> 
      <xsl:text> &amp;&amp; </xsl:text> 
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      <xsl:text> ( </xsl:text> 
      <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
     </xsl:if> 
      
     <!--end if Attribute node is the first one --> 
     <!-- except first case preceed with an or symbol --> 
     <xsl:if test="(count(preceding-sibling::Attribute) > 0)"> 
      <xsl:text> || </xsl:text> 
      <xsl:call-template name="oneAttributeContent"/> 
     </xsl:if> 
     <!-- last Attributel node to be handled here close bracket --> 
     <xsl:if test="(count(following-sibling::Attribute) = 0)"> 
      <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
      
    
   </xsl:if> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
  <!-- end for each attribute --> 
   
  <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- children of policy  template --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- GENERIC NAMED ONE ATTRIBUTE TEMPLATE  *********************** --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
 <!-- generic named template will print the attrbute and its value inside a bracket --> 
 <!-- TODO need to check if it has more than one attribute then only apply to the first one --> 
 <!-- currently lists all the attributes and put an == and the value and enclose the complete thing in brackets --> 
 <!-- eg output (attributeName == "value" )  of the context nodes attribute --> 
 <xsl:template name="oneAttributeContent" priority=".8"> 
  <xsl:for-each select="@*"> 
   <xsl:text>( </xsl:text> 
   <xsl:value-of select="local-name()"/> 
   <xsl:text> == </xsl:text> 
   <xsl:text>"</xsl:text> 
   <xsl:value-of select="."/> 
   <xsl:text>"</xsl:text> 
   <xsl:text> ) </xsl:text> 
  </xsl:for-each> 
 </xsl:template> 
 <!-- children of policy  template --> 
 <!-- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --> 
</xsl:stylesheet> 
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APPENDIX C.  WEB TEMPLATE 
 
The following is the XSL stylesheet that transforms the XML Policy file into a 
web page, depicting the policy settings in tables and color.  
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" 
xmlns:fo="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Format"> 
 <xsl:template match="/"> 
  <html> 
   <head> 
    <title> 
     Security Policy State 
      
    </title> 
   </head> 
   <body> 
    <h4 align="center"> 
     <a name="DocumentTop"/> 
     <u> 
      <ul/> 
      <h1>Security Policy State</h1> 
     </u> 
    </h4> 
    <u> 
     <ul/> 
    </u> 
    <h4>Jump To:</h4> 
    <xsl:for-each select="Policy/Conditions/ApplicationDomain/NetworkMode"> 
     <xsl:for-each select="SecurityLevel"> 
      <a href="{concat('#', ../@network_mode, @security_level)}"> 
       <xsl:value-of select="../@network_mode"/> 
       <xsl:text> - </xsl:text> 
       <xsl:value-of select="@security_level"/> 
      </a> 
      <br/> 
     </xsl:for-each> 
    </xsl:for-each> 
    <xsl:for-each select="Policy/Conditions/ApplicationDomain/NetworkMode"> 
     <xsl:for-each select="SecurityLevel"> 
      <!-- Table goes in here --> 
      <table border="1" bgcolor="000000" title="StatusTableTitle" align="center"> 
       <caption title="Our TableCaption@title"> 
       <h3> Security State of Network Policy : <a name="{concat(../@network_mode, @security_level)}"> 
          <xsl:value-of select="../@network_mode"/> 
          <xsl:text> - </xsl:text> 
          <xsl:value-of select="@security_level"/> 
         </a> 
         <br/> 
         Number of Ports Open: <xsl:value-of select="count(Port)"/> 
        </h3> 
       </caption> 
       <thead align="center" valign="middle"> 
        <!--Header--> 
       </thead> 
       <tbody> 
        <tr> 
         <!-- row 1 --> 
         <!-- row 1headers (1 coln)--> 
         <th rowspan="2" bgcolor="cccccc">Port No</th> 
         <!-- row 1 Encryption headers (5 colns) --> 
         <th colspan="12" bgcolor="aa9966">Encryption Types</th> 
         <!-- row 1 Authentication headers (3 Colns)--> 
         <th bgcolor="lightblue" colspan="5">AuthenticationTypes</th> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
         <!-- row 2 --> 
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         <!-- row 2 Encryption headers (5 colns) --> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">DES</th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">DES-IV64</th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">DES-IV32</th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">3DES</th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">RC4</th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">RC5</th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">AES</th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">IDEA</th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">3IDEA</th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">BLOWFISH </th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">CAST</th> 
         <th bgcolor="cc9966">None</th> 
         <!-- row 2 Authentication headers (3 Colns)--> 
         <th bgcolor="0066ff">HMAC-MD5</th> 
         <th bgcolor="0066ff">HMAC-SHA-1</th> 
         <th bgcolor="0066ff">HMAC-RIPEMD</th> 
         <th bgcolor="0066ff">KPDK</th> 
         <th bgcolor="0066ff">None</th> 
        </tr> 
        <!-- rows for each port --> 
        <xsl:for-each select="Port"> 
         <tr> 
          <th bgcolor="yellow"> 
           <h4> 
            <xsl:value-of select="@local_filter_port"/> 
           </h4> 
          </th> 
          <!--for each port, color appropriate cell in table--> 
          <xsl:choose> 
           <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'des' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'des-iv64' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'des-iv32' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
           <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'des3' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
           <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'rc4' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
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           <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'rc5' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
           <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'aes' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
           <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'idea' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
           <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'idea3' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'blowfish' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
           <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'cast' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
           <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm/@esp_enc_alg = 'none' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ff0000"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
         <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/AuthenticationAlgorithm/@esp_auth_alg = 'hmac-md5' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
         <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/AuthenticationAlgorithm/@esp_auth_alg = 'hmac-sha' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
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          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
        <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/AuthenticationAlgorithm/@esp_auth_alg = 'hmac-ripemd' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/AuthenticationAlgorithm/@esp_auth_alg = 'kpdk' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#00ff00"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:choose> 
          <xsl:when test="Encapsulation/AuthenticationAlgorithm/@esp_auth_alg = 'none' "> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ff0000"/> 
           </xsl:when> 
           <xsl:otherwise> 
            <td BGCOLOR="#ffffff"/> 
           </xsl:otherwise> 
          </xsl:choose> 
         </tr> 
        </xsl:for-each> 
       </tbody> 
      </table> 
 <!-- for each port, list the esp encryption algorithms, esp authentication algorithms and ah authentication 
algorithms --> 
      <xsl:for-each select="Port"> 
       <h4>Port:  <xsl:value-of select="@local_filter_port"/> 
       </h4> 
       esp Encryption Algorithm(s): 
        
       <xsl:for-each select="Encapsulation/EncryptionAlgorithm"> 
        <xsl:value-of select="@esp_enc_alg"/> 
        <xsl:text/> 
       </xsl:for-each> 
       <br/> 
               
       esp Authenication Algorithm(s): 
        
       <xsl:for-each select="Encapsulation/AuthenticationAlgorithm"> 
        <xsl:value-of select="@esp_auth_alg"/> 
        <xsl:text/> 
       </xsl:for-each> 
       <br/> 
        
       ah Authentication Algorithm(s): 
       <xsl:for-each select="Ah/AuthenticationAlgorithm"> 
        <xsl:value-of select="@ah_auth_alg"/> 
        <xsl:text/> 
       </xsl:for-each> 
       <br/> 
       <br/> 
      </xsl:for-each> 
      <h5 align="center"> 
       <a href="#DocumentTop">Back to Top of Document</a> 
      </h5> 
      <hr/> 
     </xsl:for-each> 
    </xsl:for-each> 
   </body> 





APPENDIX D.  ISAKMPD.POLICY FILE  
The following is a sample of the isakmpd.policy file (From Agar, December 
2001). This is the format that the XML policy file (User Policy File) is transformed into 
by the stylesheet in Appendix B  
 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Comment: Policy file for Network Modes and Security Levels 
Authorizer: "POLICY" 
Licensees: "passphrase:mekmitasdigoat" 
Conditions: ( (app_domain == "IPsec policy") && 
              ( 
                ( (network_mode == "normal") && 
                  ( 
                    ( (security_level == "low") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "medium") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "cast") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "high") && 
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                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "3des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                  ) 
                ) 
                || 
                ( (network_mode == "impacted") && 
                  ( 
                    ( (security_level == "low") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "medium") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
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                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "high") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "3des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                  ) 
                ) 
                || 
                ( (network_mode == "crisis") && 
                  ( 
                    ( (security_level == "low") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "3des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "medium") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "3des") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
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                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (security_level == "high") && 
                      ( 
                        ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                          (esp_enc_alg == "aes") && 
                          (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                        || 
                        ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                          ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                          (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-sha") 
                        ) 
                      ) 
                    ) 
                  ) 
                ) 
                || 
                ( (network_mode == "default") && 
                  (security_level == "default") && 
                  ( 
                    ( (esp_present == "yes") && 
                      ( (local_filter_port == "23") || (remote_filter_port == "23") ) && 
                      (esp_enc_alg == "des") && 
                      (esp_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                    ) 
                    || 
                    ( (ah_present == "yes") && 
                      ( (local_filter_port == "79") || (remote_filter_port == "79") ) && 
                      (ah_auth_alg == "hmac-md5") 
                    ) 
                  ) 
                ) 
              ) 
            ) 
       -> "true"; 
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